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The Executive Reports, We Decide: 
The Constitutionality of an Executive Branch 
Question and Report Period 
Alex Hontos∗ 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed arguably the 
largest intelligence failure in U.S. history. Mere weeks after 
the rubble stopped smoldering—and before Americans had an 
opportunity to ask their leaders questions about that day—
Congress enacted, and the President authorized, military ac-
tion1 and sweeping changes in the nation’s surveillance and 
anti-terrorism laws.2 In September 2002, after nearly a year of 
opposition, President Bush reluctantly signed legislation au-
thorizing an independent investigation of the attacks.3 Presi-
dent Bush’s signature charged the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 
with answering some of the basic questions about the events 
preceding the attacks.4 But despite a sweeping legislative man-
date5 and assurances of “unprecedented”6 cooperation from the 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003, 
St. Olaf College. The author thanks Vice President Walter Mondale, Professor 
David Stras, Professor Dale Carpenter, Professor Heidi Kitrosser, Sam Diehl, 
Todd Olin, and Lindsey Tonsager for feedback on earlier drafts; Hayley for her 
love; and his parents for making everything possible. Copyright © 2007 by 
Alex Hontos. 
 1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
 2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT 
Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
 3. David Firestone & James Risen, White House, in Shift, Backs Inquiry 
on 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at A1. 
 4. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 
107-306, tit. VI, § 602, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408 (2002) (describing the purposes of 
the 9/11 Commission). 
 5. Congress empowered the 9/11 Commission to: 
[I]nvestigate[ ] relevant facts and circumstances relating to the terror-
ist attacks of September 11, 2001, including any relevant legislation, 
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executive branch, Congress would not be able to ask the Presi-
dent directly and publicly about the events leading up to Sep-
tember 11.7 After initially refusing,8 President Bush eventually 
acceded to the 9/11 Commission’s request for an interview—but 
not without conditions. The meeting was to last no longer than 
three hours, include Vice President Cheney, and neither the 
President nor the Vice President would take an oath.9 Perhaps 
more ominous for advocates of greater government transpar-
ency, the meeting would take place behind the closed doors of 
the Oval Office and no formal record would memorialize the 
proceedings.10 
The events of September 11, 2001 exposed the failures of 
not only the U.S. intelligence apparatus, but also of the institu-
tional mechanisms meant to ensure government transparency 
and accountability. The President’s initial refusal and subse-
 
Executive order, regulation, plan, policy, practice, or procedure . . . . 
[and to] identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned from the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, regarding the structure, co-
ordination, management policies, and procedures of the Federal Gov-
ernment, and, if appropriate, State and local governments and non-
governmental entities, relative to detecting, preventing, and 
responding to such terrorist attacks. 
Id. § 604, 116 Stat. at 2409–10. 
 6. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Thomas 
H. Kean, Chairman, 9/11 Comm’n, and Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chairman, 9/11 
Comm’n (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales], avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/print/20040330-3 
.html. 
 7. It is not unprecedented for a President to appear before Congress. 
Presidents Lincoln and Ford voluntarily appeared to discuss the loyalty of 
Mary Todd’s brothers and the pardon of President Nixon, respectively. Benton 
Becker, The History of the Nixon Pardon, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 31, 46 (2000). Nor 
is it unprecedented for a President to appear before an independent commis-
sion. See PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL REVIEW BD., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPE-
CIAL REVIEW BOARD IV-12 to IV-13 (1987) (President Reagan); Tim Harper, 
“We Answered All Their Questions”; Bush and Cheney Testify About 9/11 but 
No Recording Kept, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 2004, at A1 (President George W. 
Bush). 
 8. Philip Shenon, 9/11 Panel to Seek Testimony from Bush, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2004, at A28 (noting that President Bush, when asked if he would 
submit to questioning, responded “[p]erhaps, perhaps”). 
 9. Brian Knowlton, In Rare Step, Bush Goes to 9/11 Panel, INT’L HER-
ALD TRIB. (Paris), Apr. 30, 2004, at 1; see also Harper, supra note 7. 
 10. Knowlton, supra note 9. Although public, National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice’s testimony before the Commission contained similar restric-
tions. The White House required the Commission to agree that Ms. Rice’s tes-
timony would not set precedent for future testimony of executive officials and 
that the Commission would not request further public testimony from any 
White House official. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 6. 
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quent qualified acquiescence to the 9/11 Commission demon-
strates the need for a congressional oversight mechanism 
milder than the subpoena, but with more force than the present 
congressional “invitation” to executive officials. This Note ana-
lyzes the constitutionality of a procedure used in many foreign 
parliamentary systems: the executive branch question and re-
port period. Part I briefly describes the question and report pe-
riod in foreign parliamentary systems and reviews previous ef-
forts in the United States to mandate such a system. Part II 
describes the possible constitutional sources for a question and 
report period, and identifies the most likely arguments against 
it: separation of powers and executive privilege. Part III ana-
lyzes how Congress could devise a question and report period 
that is grounded in the Constitution and that avoids relevant 
countervailing considerations. Part IV broadly outlines the con-
stitutionally permissible characteristics of a question and re-
port period involving the President and Cabinet officials. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes by calling for Congress to enact an 
executive branch question and report period to increase gov-
ernment accountability, and in so doing, to help restore Con-
gress’s status as “first among equals”11 in the U.S. constitu-
tional structure. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUESTION AND REPORT 
PERIODS   
A. QUESTION AND REPORT PERIODS ABROAD 
Virtually all parliamentary systems provide a method for 
Members of Parliament (MPs) to question the Prime Minister 
and cabinet officials, either in oral or written form.12 Although 
no two parliamentary systems are identical,13 the most recog-
nizable (and widely emulated) question and report period is the 
British House of Commons’ “Prime Minister’s Questions” and 
 
 11. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 110–
11 (2005).  
 12. See Matti Wiberg, Parliamentary Questioning: Control by Communi-
cation?, in PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 179, 180 
(Herbert Döring ed., 1995) (“Questions to ministers as a means of eliciting in-
formation about matters within their official responsibility is a common prac-
tice in all parliaments, and one of the celebrated functions of parliament.”). 
 13. Id. at 184 (“[N]o two [of the eighteen parliaments studied possessed] 
exactly identical questioning forms.”). 
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“Question Time.”14 First developed in the late eighteenth or 
early nineteenth century,15 the British practice has evolved 
only procedurally in the last half century.16 
The principal distinctions between Question Time and 
Prime Minister’s Questions are the frequency of questioning 
periods and the individuals who are asked the questions. In 
Question Time, MPs propound oral or written questions on 
each of the first four days of the week at designated times.17 In 
a typical Question Time, the minister of each department is 
obliged to come to Parliament and be available to answer MP’s 
questions for a fixed period—typically thirty to seventy min-
utes.18 Oral questions may be answered directly or not at all; 
written questions are answered—if at all—by way of publica-
tion in Hansard.19 Prime Minister’s Questions—as the name 
suggests—permits MPs to question the Prime Minister directly. 
As the Prime Minister does not receive the questions in ad-
vance and is available for at least thirty minutes, this event is 
often viewed as the highlight of the parliamentary week.20 In 
both Prime Minister’s Questions and Question Time, the 
 
 14. GEOFFREY SMITH & NELSON W. POLSBY, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND 
ITS DISCONTENTS 126 (1981) (“[A]mong the few things that most foreigners 
know about the parliamentary system is that there is a question hour.”). The 
regular broadcast of Prime Minister’s Questions on C-SPAN in the United 
States is one example of this recognition. 
 15. PATRICK HOWARTH, QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE 56 (1956) (placing the 
accidental genesis of Question Time at November 28, 1803); Philip Norton, In-
troduction: Parliament Since 1960, in PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS 1, 2 (Mark 
Franklin & Philip Norton eds., 1993) (asserting that “Question Time in the 
House dates back . . . to shortly before the nineteenth century”). 
 16. See U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS INFO. OFFICE, PARLIAMENTARY QUES-
TIONS FACTSHEET P1, at 3 (2005), available at http://www.parliament.uk/ 
documents/upload/p01.pdf. For a brief summary of these changes during the 
period 1832 through 1990, see Helen Irwin et al., Evolving Rules, in PARLIA-
MENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 23, 24–27. 
 17. See R.L. Borthwick, On the Floor of the House, in PARLIAMENTARY 
QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 73, 75; STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, RULE 21 (2002), available at http://www.publications.parliament. 
uk/pa/cm200102/cmstords/27508.htm;. 
 18. Borthwick, supra note 17, at 86. 
 19. See Irwin et al., supra note 16, at 30–31. Hansard is the traditional 
name for the transcripts of debate in parliamentary systems. See ERSKINE 
MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS, AND USAGE OF PAR-
LIAMENT 210 (C.J. Boulton et al. eds., 21st ed. 1989) It is roughly equivalent to 
the Congressional Record in the United States. J.A. Weir, Human Rights and 
Damages, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 412, 419 (2001). 
 20. BBC.com, Prime Minister’s Questions, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_ 
news/politics/82556.stm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
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Speaker of Parliament enforces time limits and the number 
and propriety of questions.21 
In both Prime Minister’s Questions and Question Time, the 
allowable subject matter of the questions is broad, but not 
unlimited.22 In most European parliaments, “the question must 
fall under the responsibilities of the government or some of its 
ministers.”23 In the Canadian Parliament, questions are in or-
der as long as they are: “[1] in fact, questions . . . , [2] asked 
about something for which the minister is responsible and an-
swerable, and [3] in parliamentary language.”24 Answers by the 
minister are acceptable as long as they “are relevant, in order, 
and in parliamentary language.”25 A minister has the option of 
refusing to reply to a question,26 as there is no formal sanction 
for refusing to answer.27 However, refusing to answer a ques-
tion may generate political repercussions.28 
B. PROPOSED QUESTION AND REPORT PERIODS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Despite its European pedigree and the inherent differences 
between parliamentary and presidential systems, an executive 
branch question and report period is not a wholly foreign con-
cept in the United States. Not long after the practice developed 
in England, Justice Story recognized the viability of allowing 
the “heads of departments . . . a seat . . . in the House of Repre-
sentatives, where they might freely debate without a title to 
vote.”29 As early as 1864, a select committee of the House of 
 
 21. Borthwick, supra note 17, at 75; Wiberg, supra note 12, at 204–05. 
 22. For a comprehensive digest of limitations on parliamentary questions 
in the British Parliament, see generally ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE 
LAW, supra note 19, at 287–94. 
 23. Wiberg, supra note 12, at 204. 
 24. C.E.S. Franks, The “Problem” of Debate and Question Period, in THE 
CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF NORMAN WARD 1, 3 
(John C. Courtney ed., 1985); see also Wiberg, supra note 12, at 205 (noting 
only three questions have been denied in Iceland’s parliament since World 
War II). 
 25. Franks, supra note 24, at 3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Cf. id. (noting that a minister can choose to “sit and ignore the ques-
tion”); Wiberg, supra note 12, at 199 (noting that a minister may decide not to 
answer, although this happens rarely). 
 28. Wiberg, supra note 12, at 199 (“It is politically intolerable to refuse to 
answer.”). 
 29. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 869, at 605 (3d ed. Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1858) (1833); 
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Representatives recommended that cabinet officers be granted 
the right to answer questions and participate in floor debates.30 
In 1881, a select committee of the Senate recommended a simi-
lar question and report period with cabinet officials.31 Over the 
next sixty years, Presidents Wilson and Taft each advocated 
some form of question and report period.32 
Of these proposals, President (and later Chief Justice) 
Taft’s was perhaps the most noteworthy. Taft’s proposal was 
unique because it was the only proposal made by a sitting 
President, and because Taft extended the invitation in his 1912 
State of the Union message.33 Taft advocated that “members of 
the President’s cabinet, should be given access to the floor of 
each House to introduce measures, to advocate their passage, to 
answer questions, and to enter into the debate as if they were 
members.”34 All of these measures could be accomplished, Taft 
opined, “[w]ithout any change in the Constitution.”35 
Although Congress declined to take up Taft’s offer, the idea 
of a question and report period resurfaced later in the twenti-
eth century. Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee introduced a 
proposal in the 1940s which was also not adopted.36 Thirty 
years later, the concept received renewed support in response 
to executive abuses and legislative branch failures related to 
Watergate and the Vietnam War.37 Minnesota Senator Walter 
Mondale’s 1973 bill, which would have required “heads of ex-
ecutive departments and agencies” to answer questions before 
 
see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, 
at 296 (1957) (“[F]ar from raising any constitutional difficulties, [a cabinet of-
ficial question and report period] has the countenance of early practice under 
the Constitution.”). 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 38-214, at 1–7 (1864). 
 31. S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 1–8 (1881). 
 32. WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 31 
(1938); WOODROW WILSON, COMMITTEE OR CABINET GOVERNMENT? (1884), 
reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 614, 634 (Arthur S. Link ed., 
1967). 
 33. President William H. Taft, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1912), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29553. 
 34. TAFT, supra note 32, at 31 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. 
 36. ESTES KEFAUVER & JACK LEVIN, A TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONGRESS 
70–79 (1947). 
 37. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 390–92 
(1973). 
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the Senate,38 was the latest in a long line of proposals for a 
question and report period in the United States. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES AND LIMITS FOR A 
QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD   
Several constitutional provisions are relevant to a question 
and report period in the United States. The Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the State of the Union Clause independently 
demonstrate the Framers’ intent to establish legislative pri-
macy and to create mechanisms for executive accountability. 
However, the separation of powers and executive privilege doc-
trines are countervailing constitutional principles that poten-
tially restrict the ability of the legislature to obtain information 
from the executive branch. 
A. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 
The Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause empowers 
Congress “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all 
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of 
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”39 
While courts have interpreted the clause to provide Congress 
with the authority for investigation and oversight of the execu-
tive branch,40 the Constitution does not expressly authorize a 
question and report period. Thus, the power to mandate such a 
requirement hinges on the construction of the words “necessary 
and proper.” 
1. Legislative Power Under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
Despite creating a government of enumerated powers,41 the 
Framers acknowledged the existence of a corpus of related 
powers beyond the literal text of the Constitution.42 However, 
 
 38. S. Res. 123, 93rd Cong. (1973). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 40. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Eastland v. U.S. Ser-
vicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 
178, 197 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). 
 41. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824) 
(“[E]numeration presupposes something not enumerated.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (noting the Necessary and Proper Clause “empowers Congress to enact 
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority 
to enact in isolation”); J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary 
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the Framers rejected the notion that the clause creates a resid-
uum of power unrelated to the enumerated powers.43 Rather, 
its primary purpose was more limited—to facilitate the exercise 
of the enumerated powers.44 Although these enabling powers 
remain dormant until Congress needs (and justifies) them, the 
clause presciently reflects that Congress may need to exercise 
the enumerated powers in new and unforeseen ways.45 
While the Framers agreed that the clause confers some 
power, its scope and content was more contentious.46 The Su-
preme Court long ago set out the basic structure for animating 
and defining these powers. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the 
Court sanctioned the creation of a national bank despite the 
lack of an explicit authorization among Congress’s enumerated 
Article I powers.47 In determining whether the Constitution 
conveyed such authority, Chief Justice Marshall proffered the 
following ends/means test: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the con-
stitution, are constitutional.”48 Because the national bank at is-
sue in McCulloch facilitated the exercise of other critical legis-
 
and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 587 (“The Necessary and Proper 
Clause plainly affirmed that Congress possesses some powers not spelled out 
in the text of the Constitution.”). 
 43. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 206 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob 
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must al-
ways be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded.”); 
id. at 205 (“[W]hy then was [the Necessary and Proper Clause] introduced? 
The answer is, that it could only have been done for greater caution.”). 
 44. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]here Congress 
has the authority to enact a regulation, ‘it possesses every power needed to 
make that regulation effective.’” (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 
315 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1942))); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), su-
pra note 43, at 304–05 (“[W]herever the end is required, the means are author-
ised; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power 
necessary for doing it, is included.”). 
 45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 43, at 304–
05 (describing the “chimerical” task of a complete digest of “laws on every sub-
ject to which the Constitution relates; accomoda[ting] . . . not only . . . the ex-
isting state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may pro-
duce”). 
 46. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 188 (2003) (describing competing 
understandings of the clause among the Framers). 
 47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819). 
 48. Id. at 421. 
HONTOS_4FMT 4/16/2007 8:51:15 AM 
2007] EXECUTIVE QUESTION & REPORT PERIODS 1055 
 
lative powers, the Court upheld its creation under the clause.49 
Since Chief Justice Marshall’s construction in McCulloch, 
the Necessary and Proper Clause has been used to justify nu-
merous legislative enactments.50 The Supreme Court has relied 
on the clause to uphold legislation involving government taking 
of private property,51 regulation of commerce,52 oversight of 
public funds,53 procedure of the federal courts,54 and use of the 
contempt power to investigate executive branch conduct.55 In 
spite of some opposition,56 the Supreme Court has recently af-
firmed both the foundational understanding of the clause as fa-
 
 49. Id. at 422–24. 
 50. See AMAR, supra note 11, at 362 (noting that during the antebellum 
period “no Court opinion [with the exception of Dred Scott] had ever held that 
a congressional statute flunked McCulloch’s deferential test of congressional 
power”); Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some 
Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1378 
(1983) (“Since the time of McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been clear that the 
Clause presents no formidable barriers to legislative activity.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1876) (recogniz-
ing the federal government’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
take property “needed for forts, armories, and arsenals, for navy-yards and 
light-houses, for custom-houses, post-offices, and court-houses, and for other 
public uses”). 
 52. See, e.g., Houston, E.&W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport 
Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914) (“[Congress] possess[es] the power to 
foster and protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or 
appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers 
may thereby be controlled.”); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 
(1838) (“Any offence which . . . interferes with, obstructs, or prevents such 
commerce and navigation, though done on land, may be punished by congress, 
under its general authority to make all laws necessary and proper to execute 
their delegated constitutional powers.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (“Congress 
has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys to 
promote the general welfare . . . and it has corresponding authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropri-
ated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988) 
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the federal venue statute, falls “comfortably 
within Congress’ powers under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause”). 
 55. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“[T]he 
power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate 
auxiliary to the legislative function.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Sabri, 541 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I find ques-
tionable the scope the Court gives to the Necessary and Proper Clause as ap-
plied to Congress’ authority to spend. In particular, the Court appears to hold 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the exercise of any power 
that is no more than a ‘rational means’ to effectuate one of Congress’ enumer-
ated powers.”). 
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cilitative (i.e., that non-enumerated powers exist, but those 
powers must be bound up with an enumerated power) and the 
clause’s viability as a source of legislative authority.57 These 
decisions have not only broadly construed Congress’s own pow-
ers but also have “made explicit what otherwise might have 
been a disputable reading of the [Constitution’s] organizing 
schema: Congress stood first among equals, with wide power to 
structure the second-mentioned executive and third-mentioned 
judicial branches.”58 
While some have viewed the terms “necessary” and 
“proper” as synonymous,59 most scholars argue that each term 
provides a distinct limitation on legislative authority.60 Mar-
shall’s interpretation of “necessary” has “never been taken to 
require ‘absolute necessity’; some sort of reasonable relation-
ship between ends and means has been sufficient.”61 On the 
other hand, a law is “proper” so long as it does not violate some 
other constitutional mandate.62 For example, a law is not 
proper for carrying into execution the Commerce Clause when 
it violates the constitutional principle of state sovereignty.63 
 
 57. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“[W]hen it enacted [the 
Controlled Substances Act], Congress was acting well within its authority to 
‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce 
. . . among the several States.’”). 
 58. AMAR, supra note 11, at 110–11; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(James Madison), supra note 43, at 350 (“In a republican government, the leg-
islative authority, necessarily, predominates.”). 
 59. See, e.g., JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND 
SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 73 n.23 (1956) (“[O]nly one of 
the Federalists made any reference to the word ‘proper’ from the necessary 
and proper clause. They seemed to assume that anything was proper which 
they deemed necessary.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Original Understanding and the Un-
written Constitution, in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: SIX ESSAYS ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 145, 163–64 (Neil L. York ed., 1988) (“[L]aws passed by Con-
gress must be both instrumentally useful in pursuing one of Congress’s dele-
gated powers (necessary) and consistent with traditionally recognized princi-
ples of individual right (proper).”); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweep-
ing Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 275 (1993) (“The [Necessary and Proper Clause] 
specifies that any laws enacted under its authority must be both necessary 
and proper—in the conjunctive.”). 
 61. Carter, supra note 50, at 1378. 
 62. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 60, at 297 (“[U]nder a jurisdic-
tional construction of the Sweeping Clause, executory laws must be consistent 
with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individ-
ual rights.”); cf. Beck, supra note 42, at 639 (describing the “conceptual and 
practical difficulties” with Lawson and Granger’s propriety requirement). 
 63. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997); New York v. 
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Marshall’s test reveals that Congress would possess “all powers 
expressly listed in [the Constitution] and also anything that fol-
lowed by fair, commonsensical implication.”64 The constitu-
tional validity of a power claimed under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause depends, therefore, on whether that power is an 
appropriate means to exercise a legitimate end.65 
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause and Investigatory Power 
Absent impeachment,66 the Constitution does not expressly 
authorize Congress to investigate the President, the executive 
branch, or the administrative bureaucracy.67 This omission is 
surprising given the importance of the inquiry power in the 
British Parliament and the colonial legislatures.68 Nonetheless, 
after ratification of the Constitution, Congress quickly seized 
the opportunity to inquire into executive branch conduct as a 
necessary component of its legislative function. 
In creating the Treasury Department, the first Congress 
required the Secretary of the Treasury to “report, and give in-
formation to either branch of the legislature, in person or in 
writing (as he may be required), respecting all matters referred 
to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which 
shall appertain to his office.”69 The records of that first Con-
gress are also filled with examples of questions directed at (and 
answered by) executive officials.70 In 1792, the House of Repre-
 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
 64. AMAR, supra note 11, at 110. 
 65. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636 (1882) (“‘Whenever, 
therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular 
power, the first question is whether the power be expressed in the Constitu-
tion. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry 
must be whether it is properly an incident to an express power and necessary 
to its execution. If it be, then it may be exercised by Congress. If not, Congress 
cannot exercise it.’” (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 29, § 1243, at 136)). 
 66. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 67. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“[Congress 
has] no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without 
justification . . . . No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in 
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”). 
 68. See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 
15–34 (1974) (noting the importance of inquiry power in British practice and 
colonial legislatures); James Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Con-
gressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 159–68 (1926) (same). 
 69. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (1789) 
(emphasis added). 
 70. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 51 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“The Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs [Thomas Jefferson] attended, agreeably to order, and 
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sentatives initiated the first congressional investigation of ex-
ecutive branch conduct.71 After the country lost hundreds of 
soldiers in a disastrous military campaign, the House estab-
lished a committee to investigate the conduct of the executive 
branch official in charge of the expedition.72 The House author-
ized the committee to “call for such persons, papers, and re-
cords, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.”73 Two 
years later, the Senate directed President Washington “to lay 
before the Senate the correspondences which have been had be-
tween the Minister of the United States at the Republic of 
France and said Republic, and between said Minister and the 
office of Secretary of State.”74 
A half-century later, Congress described its authority to 
investigate the executive branch as “not merely an accidental 
right, but an original one, inherent in it, and not an incident of 
some particular duty.”75 These investigations show the early 
understanding that Congress possessed broad investigatory 
powers. Notwithstanding Congress’s own view on the matter, 
the Supreme Court has independently affirmed the legitimacy 
of congressional investigation generally76 and investigation of 
the executive branch specifically.77 
Judicial recognition of the power to investigate followed 
from these early parliamentary,78 colonial assembly,79 and con-
 
made the necessary explanations . . . .”); id. at 66 (“The President of the 
United States came into the Senate Chamber, attended by General Knox [the 
Secretary of War], and laid before the Senate the following statement of facts, 
with the questions thereto annexed, for their advice and consent . . . .”). 
 71. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493–94 (1792); TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND IN-
QUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 13–29 (1955); George 
B. Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress, 21 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 47, 
56 (1927). 
 72. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1792). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 38 (1794). 
 75. H.R. REP. NO. 27-271, at 13 (1843) (emphasis added). 
 76. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (describing Congress’s in-
vestigatory function as “incidental to the legislative function”); Eastland v. 
U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (“The power to investigate 
. . . plainly falls within [the legitimate legislative sphere]”); Watkins v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957) (“[A]n investigation is part of lawmaking. It is 
justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process.”). 
 77. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (approving a congres-
sional inquiry into alleged executive branch malfeasance related to the Teapot 
Dome scandal because the power to “secure needed information . . . has long 
been treated as an attribute of the power to legislate”). 
 78. Id. (describing the inquiry power as “an attribute of the power to legis-
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gressional practices.80 The Supreme Court has described the 
scope of this inherent investigatory power as “broad” 81 and “as 
penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact 
and appropriate under the Constitution.”82 In other words, 
Congress’s ability to inquire is limited only by the need to “be 
related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Con-
gress.”83 To that end, Congress may conduct inquiries concern-
ing “the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or 
possibly needed statutes. [Congress’s investigatory power] in-
cludes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political sys-
tem for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.”84 
Investigation, inquiry, and oversight are all intimately related 
to these purposes.85 
B. THE STATE OF THE UNION CLAUSE 
Article II’s State of the Union Clause provides additional 
authority for a question and report period. The State of the Un-
ion Clause directs the President to “from time to time give to 
the Congress information of the state of the union.”86 The Su-
preme Court has never construed the meaning of the State of 
the Union Clause, and only one federal court has cited the 
clause in a published opinion.87 
 
late” because “[i]t was so regarded in the British Parliament”). 
 79. Id. at 174 (noting that this power was “employed in American legisla-
tures before the Constitution was framed and ratified”). 
 80. Id. at 161–68. 
 81. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
 82. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959); see also William 
P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 798 (“Congress’s power to investigate the President 
. . . was to be vital and expansive.”). 
 83. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187; cf. Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111–12 (“Since 
Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially 
legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the 
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government.”). 
 84. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added). 
 85. AMAR, supra note 11, at 112 (“Though Article I did not explicitly enu-
merate the point, [the Necessary and Proper Clause] . . . gave each house of 
Congress broad powers of investigation and oversight . . . that were necessary 
and proper adjuncts to Congress’s enumerated powers to enact legislation, ap-
propriate funds, conduct impeachments, and propose constitutional amend-
ments.”). 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 87. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. 
Supp. 2d 20, 50 n.15 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated and remanded on other grounds 
sub nom. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
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The dearth of judicial authority is mirrored in the legal 
scholarship. Other than the acknowledgement that the State of 
the Union Clause derives, in large part, from the “royal act of 
communicating with [the British] parliament,”88 the clause is 
“embarrassingly underexamined.”89 Vasan Kesavan and J. 
Gregory Sidak argue that the clause supports an early under-
standing of the President as the nation’s chief lawmaker.90 Pro-
fessor Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes argue that the 
clause does not impede the unitary executive theory of Article 
II power.91 In 1974, Professor Raoul Berger described the Presi-
dent’s obligations under the clause as “an unqualified duty to 
inform Congress as to matters within the Executive Depart-
ment.”92 While that view may stretch the clause to its outer 
limits,93 the clause serves the broader purpose of communica-
tion through at least three distinct functions. First, it recog-
nizes that the President (and executive branch officials) would 
likely have superior access to information critical for legislative 
policy making.94 Second, it encourages dialogue between the 
executive and legislative branches by mandating communica-
 
 88. C. ELLIS STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO COLONIAL AND ENGLISH HISTORY 158 (2d 
ed. New York, MacMillan & Co. 1894); see also Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory 
Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) (recogniz-
ing the State of the Union Clause was “drafted against the backdrop of the 
British practice whereby the Monarch would open each session of Parliament 
with a ‘Speech from the Throne’”). 
 89. Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 5. 
 90. Id. at 3. 
 91. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1207 n.262 
(1992). 
 92. BERGER, supra note 68, at 37. 
 93. Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privi-
lege: A Response to Berger, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 541, 555 (2000) (“In 
practice, presidents have used the State of the Union address to present in-
formation that they wanted to reveal to Congress, not information that Con-
gress compelled them to present.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions 
on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 658 (1996) (describing the State of 
the Union Clause as “exemplify[ing] a meeting of equals, somewhere between 
a Presidential right and a Presidential duty”). 
 94. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. 
Supp. 2d 20, 50 n.15 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting the State of the Union Clause “pre-
supposes superior or at least different access to information than the legisla-
tive branch”), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Cheney v. 
U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
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tion “from time to time.”95 Finally, the clause underscores the 
importance of transparency in a liberal democracy.96 
Historically, the degree of inter-branch dialogue has been 
mixed. While every President has complied with the minimum 
requirements of the State of the Union Clause,97 some have en-
gaged Congress more than others. The earliest practice in-
volved an in-person, annual speech to Congress.98 But begin-
ning with Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, compliance with the 
clause took the form of a written declaration, a form which con-
tinued for the next 112 years.99 In 1913, Woodrow Wilson re-
newed the practice of delivering the message in person by ad-
dressed a joint session of Congress.100 The modern practice is a 
scripted, annual speech before a joint session of Congress that 
outlines the President’s agenda for the coming year.101 
C. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
Congressional query of executive branch officials unavoid-
ably implicates the doctrine of separation of powers. To ensure 
the United States would remain a “government of laws and not 
of men,”102 the Constitution “create[d] three distinct and sepa-
rate departments—the legislative, the executive, and the judi-
cial.”103 The separation of these departments was “not merely a 
matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism.”104 
Rather, the doctrine’s central purpose was to “preclude a com-
 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also 1 STORY, supra note 29, § 869, at 604–
05; Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 104 (1994); Adrian Vermeule, Ju-
dicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1340 (1999). 
 96. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
1349, 1371 n.100 (2001) (observing that the State of the Union Clause was one 
of several “good government” provisions promoting “transparency by requiring 
the President to report on the State of the Union”). 
 97. The White House, From Time to Time: History of the State of the Un-
ion, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2005/history.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2007). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.; see also Gerhard Peters, The Am. Presidency Project, State of the 
Union Messages, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php (last visited Mar. 7, 
2007). 
 102. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(describing the origin of the phrase in the American colonies and its role in 
separation of powers). 
 103. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933). 
 104. Id. 
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mingling of these essentially different powers of government in 
the same hands.”105 Put another way, no branch “ought to pos-
sess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the ad-
ministration of their respective powers.”106 Separation of pow-
ers “does not create or grant power; it only protects powers 
conferred by the Constitution.”107 
While separation of powers’ principal purpose was to se-
cure liberty, “[the Constitution] also contemplates that practice 
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable govern-
ment. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interde-
pendence, autonomy but reciprocity.”108 In more recent years 
the debate has shifted from foundational (and more theoretical) 
understandings of separation of powers to the doctrine’s practi-
cal application to contemporary legal problems.109 The Court 
has inconsistently110 alternated between two competing separa-
tion of powers approaches: formalism and functionalism.111 Ir-
 
 105. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 43, 
at 324 (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in 
the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 43, at 349 (“In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty 
lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and 
in the next place oblige it to control itself.”). 
 106. 1 STORY, supra note 29, § 530, at 371. 
 107. BERGER, supra note 68, at 45. 
 108. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 109. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 2 (1938) (“The 
insistence upon the compartmentalization of power along triadic lines gave 
way in the nineteenth century to the exigencies of governance.”). 
 110. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Ad-
ministrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (“There is general consensus among scholars that 
the Court has exhibited a ‘split personality’ in separation of powers cases. The 
Court has alternated between an anything-goes functionalist method that ‘ap-
pears to be designed to do little more than rationalize incursions by one 
branch into the domain of another,’ and a rigid but principled formalist 
method that almost always leads to invalidation of the challenged governmen-
tal action. There has been little explanation or apparent rationale for the 
Court’s flipping between these two methods of analysis.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 
SUP. CT. REV. 225, 226 (“The Court has alternated between the formal and 
functional constructions [of the doctrine] . . . .”). 
 111. Compare the formalism of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983), 
where the Court noted that “the powers delegated to [each of ] the three 
branches are functionally identifiable,” with the more functionalist approach 
in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977), which 
denounced President Nixon’s argument as “an archaic view of the separation 
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respective of analytical approach, the separation of powers doc-
trine presents a potentially formidable barrier to legislative in-
formation requests.112 
Although Congress’s inquiry authority is broad,113 separa-
tion of powers constrains Congress’s ability to compel informa-
tion on any subject.114 In the context of legislative information 
requests, as with other separation of powers inquiries, the 
Court looks to “a number of factors in evaluating the extent to 
which the congressional scheme endangers separation of pow-
ers principles under the circumstances presented.”115 Separa-
tion of powers imposes three general limits on the method and 
scope of legislative information requests: the request must re-
late to the branch’s legitimate functions,116 it must not arrogate 
the power of a coordinate branch,117 and it cannot impede an-
other branch’s constitutionally prescribed functions.118 
 
of powers as requiring three airtight departments of government.” 
 112. While the judiciary debated competing theories of separation of pow-
ers, Congress’s regulation of executive branch information continued un-
abated. Even the Court noted there is “abundant statutory precedent for the 
regulation and mandatory disclosure of documents in the possession of the Ex-
ecutive Branch.” Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 445. Legislative enactments 
evincing Congress’s power to compel executive branch information sharing in-
clude the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2000) (requiring 
executive agencies to give notice and reasoning in rulemaking context), the 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (directing executive agen-
cies to make information available to the public), the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. 
L. No. 93-579 § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a 
(2000)) (regulating the disclosure of information), Census Act, 13 U.S.C. § 8 
(2000) (governing the disposition of census data), and Internal Revenue Code, 
26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2000) (regulating the IRS’s use of tax information). 
 113. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
 114. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959) (“Broad 
as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may 
only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or ap-
propriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive prov-
ince of one of the other branches of the Government.”). Congress is also con-
strained in ways unrelated to separation of powers. See Eastland v. U.S. 
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975) (“We have made it clear, 
however, that Congress is not invested with a ‘general’ power to inquire into 
private affairs.”). 
 115. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 
(1986). 
 116. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927). 
 117. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Schor, 478 U.S. at 
856; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam). 
 118. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996); Nixon v. Adm’r 
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
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The first of these factors is unique in the legislative inquiry 
context. This factor analyzes the extent to which the challenged 
conduct is germane to that branch’s legitimate functions. In the 
inquiry context, this limits the subject matter of a legislative 
inquiry to only that “on which legislation could be had.”119 For 
example, a President could decline legislative requests for in-
formation on a pardon “on the ground that the matter is solely 
executive in nature and of no concern to Congress . . . .”120 
The Court outlined a second separation of powers-based 
factor limiting the conduct of one branch in Morrison v. Ol-
son.121 There, the Court upheld the provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act creating an independent prosecutor to investi-
gate executive branch conduct.122 In so holding, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist emphasized that the Act did not “involve an attempt 
by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the 
Executive Branch.”123 Although the Act empowered Congress to 
ask the Attorney General to appoint an independent prosecu-
tor, the Attorney General had “no duty to comply with the re-
quest.”124 Because the Act did not compel compliance by execu-
tive officials or represent a congressional arrogation of power, it 
withstood a constitutional challenge.125 Therefore, the extent to 
which one branch controls the actions of another is a second 
critical factor in the Court’s separation of powers analysis.126 
 
 119. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177. 
 120. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 
THE PRESIDENT 183 (4th ed. rev. 1997). 
 121. 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988). 
 122. Id. at 696–97. 
 123. Id. at 694 (emphasis added); see also Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (“[T]his case raises no question of 
the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate 
branch.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (“The Framers 
regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Fed-
eral Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”). 
 124. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694. 
 125. Id. at 695. 
 126. Id.; see also id. at 696 (“[T]he Act does give the Attorney General sev-
eral means of supervising or controlling the prosecutorial powers that may be 
wielded by an independent counsel.”). For another case drawing the line at 
compulsion, yet upholding legislative efforts to control access to executive 
branch conduct, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 
445 (1977), which upheld the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preserva-
tion Act directing executive officials to take custody of forty-two million pages 
and 880 tape recordings created during the Nixon presidency. 
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The final factor is related to the second, but conceptually 
distinct. The Court’s inquiry focuses on the extent to which the 
legislative action “prevents the Executive Branch from accom-
plishing its constitutionally assigned functions.” 127 Only where 
the potential for disruption is present must the Court then de-
termine “whether that impact is justified by an overriding need 
to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of 
Congress.”128 
D. THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE 
In addition to separation of powers, the legislative inquiry 
power implicates a related doctrine: executive privilege. The 
Supreme Court has long shielded the executive branch from in-
quiries related to military and diplomatic secrets.129 The sub-
ject matter and scope of presidential privileges are not, how-
ever, unqualified.130 In United States v. Nixon, President 
Richard Nixon challenged a subpoena to produce materials re-
lated to the Watergate criminal investigation.131 Because the 
materials were not related to national security or diplomatic 
secrets, Nixon asserted that production of the materials in-
fringed a “generalized interest in confidentiality.”132 While not-
ing the absence of a privilege in the Constitution,133 and reject-
ing Nixon’s own broad construction,134 the Court nonetheless 
recognized a limited privilege for communications “in perform-
 
 127. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443; see also Loving v. United States, 
517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Even when a branch does not arrogate power to it-
self . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair 
another in the performance of its constitutional duties.”). 
 128. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443; see also United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the 
judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve 
those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions 
of each branch.”). 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Chi. & S. 
Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). 
 130. Even in the context of military and diplomatic secrets, secrecy is not 
sacrosanct. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) 
(Black, J., concurring) (“The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the 
expense of informed representative government provides no real security for 
our Republic.”). 
 131. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 688. 
 132. Id. at 711. 
 133. Id. (“Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference to 
a privilege of confidentiality.”). 
 134. Id. (“No case of the Court . . . has extended [a privilege] to a Presi-
dent’s generalized interest in confidentiality.”). 
HONTOS_4FMT 4/16/2007 8:51:15 AM 
1066 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1047 
 
ance of [a President’s] responsibilities . . . of his office . . . and 
made ‘in the process of shaping policies and making deci-
sions.’”135 Since Nixon, the Court has reiterated the extraordi-
nary and limited nature of executive privilege.136 
III.  ANALYSIS   
This Part considers two constitutional sources for the ques-
tion and report period: the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
the State of the Union Clause. Pursuant to these clauses Con-
gress can, by statutory enactment, create a constitutional ex-
ecutive branch question and report period. This period could be 
crafted to avoid separation of powers concerns and to recognize 
the validity of executive privilege. 
A. A QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD IS A NECESSARY AND 
PROPER EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
A question and report period satisfies Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s ends/means test from McCulloch because it is reasona-
bly related to a legitimate legislative function (necessary) and 
does not offend other constitutional precepts (proper). A ques-
tion and report period is necessary because its central purpose 
is to gather information (to formulate public policy, inform the 
public, or exercise oversight). Additionally, a question and re-
port period is proper because it need not offend other constitu-
tional principles, namely separation of powers and executive 
privilege. 
As a threshold matter, the enumerated power to which the 
question and report period attaches is the entire bundle of 
enumerated powers in Article I, because, as the Supreme Court 
has recognized, information-gathering is a necessary aspect of 
the effective exercise of the general “legislative power.”137 This 
general legislative power necessarily subsumes the specific leg-
 
 135. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (quoting 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 711, 713). 
 136. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 389 (2004) (“Execu-
tive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power not to be lightly in-
voked.”); Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 446 (“[Executive] privilege is a 
qualified one.”); see also Vermeule, supra note 95, at 1340 (“[E]xecutive privi-
lege and related protections are properly viewed as exceptions to a general 
presumption that executive business should be open to public scrutiny.”). 
 137. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Eastland v. U.S. Ser-
vicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 
178, 197 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). 
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islative powers enumerated in the Constitution (e.g., Com-
merce, War, Appropriations). Though the Court’s language in 
these cases is often a mix of Necessary and Proper Clause and 
implied powers, the Court is unambiguous in concluding that 
the power to investigate is inextricably bound up with legisla-
tive power as a whole.138 The implication of this conclusion is 
that any congressional inquiry relying on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause (e.g., committee hearings, a question and report 
period) cannot stray from those areas in which the Congress 
has the power to legislate.139 
1. A Question and Report Period Is Constitutionally 
Necessary 
A question and report period is only necessary if it would 
serve a legitimate legislative function. Given that the Court has 
already affirmed the legitimacy of information-gathering,140 the 
issue becomes whether a question and report period would fur-
ther purposes that are related to this inquiry function. The 
most significant purpose related to the inquiry function in-
cludes gathering information to legislate effectively, to educate 
the public, and to robustly exercise Congress’s oversight role in 
determining appropriations and program efficacy.141 
a. Shape Effective Legislation 
The reason for government, particularly a representative 
assembly in a liberal democratic system, is to formulate and 
enact public policy.142 Information forms the basis for this pub-
lic policy, and therefore it is the lifeblood of representative gov-
ernment.143 The institutions of the U.S. government reflect this 
 
 138. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197; McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174–75. 
 139. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959). 
 140. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197; 
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174–75. 
 141. Galloway, supra note 71, at 60–64. 
 142. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 101 (2005) (describing the Consti-
tution’s use of the legislature to “translate public will, determined through col-
lective deliberation, into sound public policy”); Robert B. Seidman, Justifying 
Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the Memorandum of 
Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 69 
n.205 (1992) (describing the democratic legislature as the “ultimate source of 
legitimate and authoritative policy initiatives”). 
 143. Cf. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 
105 (1991) (noting that legislatures rely on committees to investigate and to 
apply specialized knowledge to specific fields of legislation); Scott Ashworth, 
Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 444 
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syllogism. Without access to information—from the public, aca-
demia, non-governmental organizations, and others—Congress 
cannot create intelligent and responsive laws.144 As the admin-
istrative state has expanded,145 the executive branch has be-
come an increasingly critical source of information.146 Because 
the legislative process depends on Congress’s ability to procure 
information,147 the authority to inquire must be broad and 
sweeping. A question and report period recognizes the increas-
ing importance of the executive branch qua information 
source.148 
Just as in parliamentary systems, in the United States a 
question and report period would serve as an important forum 
for Congress to quickly collect and assess information from the 
executive branch to formulate public policy.149 Although a com-
 
(2005) (“[L]egislatures organize themselves to facilitate information collection 
about the effects of potential policies.”). 
 144. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (arguing that a Con-
gress without investigatory powers “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in 
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is 
intended to affect or change”). 
 145. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 634, 691 (2000) (“One statistic is worth a million words: in 1802, the 
number of nonmilitary officials working for the federal government was pre-
cisely 2,597; in 1997, it was 1,872,000.”). In 2005, the federal government em-
ployed 1,754,000 full-time civilians (not including congressional, judiciary, and 
postal employees). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2007, at 321 tbl.481 (Oct. 2006), available at http://www 
.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/fedgov.pdf. 
 146. Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the 
Struggle for Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 739 (2002) 
(“The subjects of potential lawmaking and investigation have increased a 
hundredfold since the beginnings of the nation, and it is only natural that 
Congress’s need for information has paralleled that rise.”). 
 147. Marshall, supra note 82, at 799 (“Legislative bodies would be unable 
to effectively evaluate policy alternatives and weigh competing priorities if 
they could not call witnesses and otherwise inquire into complex issues. In-
deed, it is often through congressional hearings and investigations that foun-
dational ideas and insights of how to address social ills are generated.”). 
 148. See id. at 783 (“Congress’s dependence upon the Executive to provide 
. . . information will only increase as social and economic issues become ever 
more complex.”); Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional 
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2523 (2006) (noting that the executive branch has 
access to “broader forms” of information in certain areas than does Congress); 
Wald & Siegel, supra note 146, at 739 (describing the executive branch as “the 
repository of the country’s most important information for public policy formu-
lation”). 
 149. Philip Norton, Questions and the Role of Parliament, in PARLIAMEN-
TARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 194, 198 (“Questions can serve to elicit in-
formation for a variety of purposes: for the benefit of Members . . . their con-
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plete understanding of public policy has never been a prerequi-
site for crafting legislation,150 providing the legislator with a 
broad information-gathering mandate is nevertheless impor-
tant (even if only as a normative matter). In other words, where 
Congress “does not itself possess the requisite information—
which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others 
who do possess it.”151 Through direct or written questioning, 
legislators would be able to ask the executive branch for spe-
cific information about the activities and expertise of the execu-
tive branch.152 This approach would not only better inform leg-
islators, because each would receive a specific answer to her 
inquiry,153 but also could decrease the time required to address 
emerging issues.154 Instead of resorting to the non-compulsory 
committee hearing or compulsory subpoena processes, Congress 
would have a regular forum to direct specific inquiries at execu-
tive officials. This informing role is more than anecdotal. A sur-
vey of British MPs demonstrated the importance of the ques-
tion and report period as a tool for information gathering.155 Of 
those MPs surveyed, over half (55%) found oral questions use-
ful in discovering hard-to-get information, while almost all 
(97%) found written questions useful in discovering the 
same.156 Legislative questioning is but one means to quickly 
expose Congress to expert data and analysis available only 
from the administrative bureaucracy. 
 
stituents, their party, and for particular groups.”). 
 150. Cf. W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring 
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 404 
(1992) (“Legislators rarely read the entire text of a bill on which they vote, and 
sometimes they do not read any of it, relying instead on committee reports, 
staff summaries, and discussions and debates with other legislators.”). 
 151. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927). 
 152. TAFT, supra note 32, at 32 (noting that the presence of executive offi-
cials in Congress would “keep each House advised of the facts in the actual op-
eration of the government”). 
 153. KEFAUVER & LEVIN, supra note 36, at 72 (“[T]here would be a great 
gain in knowledge and background acquired in a manner far more economical 
of time and energy than any present available method, such as plodding 
through a thousand-page committee hearing.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Philip Giddings, Questions and Departments, in PARLIAMEN-
TARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 123, 146 (noting that the British Question 
Time “accelerated policy responses” to a public health crisis). 
 155. Mark Franklin & Philip Norton, Questions and Members, in PARLIA-
MENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 104, 109. 
 156. Id. 
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b. Inform the Public 
Ascertaining information to formulate public policy is one, 
but not the only, legitimate purpose for a question and report 
period. Like Congress’s investigatory powers generally,157 the 
question and report period can serve as a means to disseminate 
information to the public. As President Woodrow Wilson ele-
gantly noted, “[E]ven more important than legislation is the in-
struction and guidance in political affairs which the people 
might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suf-
fused in a broad daylight of discussion.”158 As a result, Presi-
dent Wilson concluded, “[t]he informing function of Congress 
should be preferred even to its legislative function.”159 Stated 
another way, “the American people cannot make informed bal-
lot judgments, and express their approval or disapproval of 
elected officials, if they do not know what [those officials] have 
done and why.” 160 
A question and report period in the United States would 
better enable the voters to acquire information about their gov-
ernment and its leaders. In the United Kingdom, various inter-
est and constituent groups use the answers to parliamentary 
questions to educate their members and to publicize disfavored 
government policies.161 Question and report periods in parlia-
mentary systems, although not perfect, have, at the very least, 
popularized political debate.162 In the United States, a question 
and report period would not only educate the public about 
cleavages between Congress and the executive branch, but also 
 
 157. Marshall, supra note 82, at 799 (“Congress’s power to investigate is 
. . . critical to its duties to inform the public of the inner workings and issues of 
government.”). 
 158. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 297 (1901) 
 159. Id. at 303. 
 160. Matthew Cooper Weiner, Note, In the Wake of Whitewater: Executive 
Privilege and the Institutionalized Conflict Element of Separation of Powers, 
12 J.L. & POL. 775, 780 (1996). 
 161. Philip Norton, Questions Outside Parliament, in PARLIAMENTARY 
QUESTIONS, supra note 15, at 176, 180 (“[Constituencies] make use of PQs as a 
valuable means of identifying the particular interests of the MPs and . . . their 
stance on those issues.”). 
 162. See Borthwick, supra note 17, at 87 (“[Question Time] has become a 
spectator sport, first for the radio and now for the television audience.”); 
Franks, supra note 24, at 3–4 (“The main topics [of Question Time] are often 
those on the front pages of the major newspapers, or ones raised on national 
television news the previous evening.”); Norton, supra note 161, at 182–83 
(noting the prevalence of coverage in the broadcast media). 
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between each party’s substantive views on the issues.163 While 
it is true that a question and report period may involve grand-
standing and partisanship,164 the wisdom and utility of a ques-
tion period is for the people (via the legislature) to decide.165 
And while it may involve theatrics, at least the theater is po-
litical.166 By disseminating government policies and leadership 
styles throughout the public forum, a question and report pe-
riod is undoubtedly a necessary component of Congress’s in-
forming function. 
c. Foster Accountability and Oversight 
A question and report period is also constitutionally neces-
sary because it is a critical component of Congress’s constitu-
tionally mandated accountability and oversight functions. Con-
gress undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in holding the 
executive branch accountable.167 Various constitutional clauses 
elevate principles of accountability to the fore of Congress’s re-
sponsibility as the chosen representatives of “We the People.”168 
A question and report period will assist Congress’s accountabil-
ity function in at least two principal ways: facilitating actual 
oversight of executive departments,169 and improving the qual-
ity of leadership within both the legislative and executive 
branches.170 
First, a question and report period will assist Congress in 
its oversight role, shining the light of accountability into the 
 
 163. Norton, supra note 149, at 199 (“Question Time serves to release—and 
to some extent channel—the tensions and passions aroused by disagreement 
between the parties.”). 
 164. Giddings, supra note 154, at 149 (“Question Time itself has become a 
much more partisan occasion, a piece of regular political theatre.”); Norton, 
supra note 149, at 195–97. 
 165. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1904) (noting the peo-
ple, through the electoral process, and not the courts, possess the power to 
remedy “abuses committed in the exercise of a lawful power”). 
 166. The Senate select committee dismissed concerns about grandstanding, 
noting that the “judgment by the people” will “correct any antagonism which 
threatens the effective working of the government.” S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8 
(1881). 
 167. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, 
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2343 (2006) (“[A] crucial part of Con-
gress’s job is keeping the Executive accountable.”). 
 168. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (Impeachment Clause); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (General Welfare Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
(Advice and Consent Clause). 
 169. Galloway, supra note 71, at 61. 
 170. S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8 (1881). 
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darkest corners of the administrative bureaucracy. Congress’s 
function as “guardian of the public purse,” for example, means 
“the conduct of public servants, their efficiency and their integ-
rity, must then be subject to the severest scrutiny of that organ 
of the government that determines whether or not they shall 
subsist.”171 The legislative bodies in parliamentary systems 
share this oversight function. In a survey of British MPs, the 
most frequent rationale for propounding questions during Par-
liamentary Questions “was in order to hold ministers account-
able for their actions and those of their subordinates.”172 One 
commentator went further, describing the “bureaucrat’s knowl-
edge that he may at any time be called upon to account for his 
actions” by Parliament as one of two factors ensuring that a 
benevolent bureaucracy does not become a despotism.173 In the 
United States, President Wilson lauded similar positive effects, 
noting that in Congress “a single quick and pointed and well-
directed question from a keen antagonist may utterly betray 
any minister who has aught to conceal.”174 Moreover, a ques-
tion and report period would allow direct questions about ex-
ecutive branch policies and responses to emerging problems 
(e.g., natural or man-made disasters). As in the United King-
dom, more immediate oversight could correct administrative 
inaction before it becomes a crisis (e.g., Hurricane Katrina).175 
A question and report period is intimately related to Congress’s 
constitutionally assigned oversight function. 
A question and report period would also increase account-
ability in a related way: improving the quality of leadership 
within both the executive176 and legislative branches.177 Know-
 
 171. Landis, supra note 68, at 194. 
 172. Franklin & Norton, supra note 155, at 108; see also JOHN D. MILLETT, 
THE BRITISH UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE BOARD 160 (1940) (“The most use-
ful means of keeping the work of [an administrative program] under constant 
review is through the institution of questions asked in the House of Com-
mons.”); Cornelius P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British 
Experience, 6 STAN. L. REV. 238, 284 (1954) (praising Question Time as “a de-
vice for exposing inadequacies in program administration and for compelling 
correction”). 
 173. HOWARTH, supra note 15, at 6. 
 174. Woodrow Wilson, Government by Debate: Being a Short View of Our 
National Government as It Is and as It Might Be (Dec. 4, 1882), in 2 THE PA-
PERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 32, at 159, 218. 
 175. Giddings, supra note 154, at 146–48 (describing parliamentary pres-
sure on the government).  
 176. SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 392 (“[A] question hour could subtly 
alter the balance of [the President’s] power both as against his cabinet, whose 
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ing that top officials will regularly spar with Congress over sub-
stantive matters of policy, the President might take greater 
care in choosing capable (and rhetorically adroit) cabinet offi-
cials.178 Once selected, these officials would have greater incen-
tive to know the inner-workings of their departments.179 Presi-
dent Taft suggested that fear of direct, public inquiry would 
stimulate “a more thorough familiarity with the actual opera-
tions of [the Cabinet official’s] department.”180 Senator Estes 
Kefauver and Jack Levin posited that executive officials “would 
consider more deliberately their decisions and administrative 
orders if they knew they might be called upon to render an offi-
cial public accounting in the spotlight of an open House session. 
. . . These men would have to know their departments and be 
able to give the facts.”181 President Wilson put the benefit of a 
question and report period as it related to Congress’s legitimate 
oversight role more bluntly: “Charlatans [in either the legisla-
tive or executive branches] cannot long play statesmen success-
fully when the whole country is sitting as critic.”182 While these 
benefits more clearly apply to oral questions, responses to writ-
ten questions will also bring new scrutiny of official action.183 
As a question and report period is logically related to the exer-
cise of the enumerated powers, it satisfies the Court’s necessary 
prong. 
 
members would have the chance to acquire new visibility and develop their 
own relationships with Congress and the electorate, and as against Congress, 
which would have the opportunity of playing off his own cabinet against 
him.”). 
 177. S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8 (1881) (“[A question and report period] will 
require the strongest men to be the leaders of Congress and participate in de-
bate.”). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Richard Nixon, upon witnessing a session of the British Parliament, 
described the experience as “inspiring and compelling.” He added, “I came 
away with a deep appreciation and respect for the ability of the British par-
liamentarian to stand up during the question period and answer so effectively. 
I believe that your question period is much more of an ordeal than our press 
conference.” President Richard Nixon, Remarks on Departure from Britain, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 149 (Feb. 26, 1969). 
 180. TAFT, supra note 32, at 31. 
 181. KEFAUVER & LEVIN, supra note 36, at 73–74. 
 182. Wilson, supra note 174, at 218. 
 183. Franklin & Norton, supra note 155, at 108–09. 
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2. A Question and Report Period Is Constitutionally Proper 
To serve as an adjunct to an enumerated power, a congres-
sionally enacted question and report period also must not of-
fend other constitutional principles.184 Because a properly 
crafted question and report period need not violate separation 
of powers or executive privilege, it will satisfy the proper prong 
of Chief Justice Marshall’s Necessary and Proper Clause analy-
sis. 
a. Separation of Powers 
Given the unique structural composition of the U.S gov-
ernment, separation of powers presents the most difficult con-
stitutional issue for a question and report period. This issue is 
especially relevant given the reliance on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the source for a question and report period. 
The Supreme Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence illus-
trates the characteristics of a question and report period that 
are within (and without) the bounds of the Constitution. 
First and foremost, a congressionally enacted question and 
report period must not violate separation of powers as it relates 
to legislative information gathering. The Court has made clear 
that valid information requests are limited to areas where 
Congress can constitutionally legislate.185 But because of the 
broad scope of the legislative power to investigate,186 this re-
quirement is a limitation in name only. For example, because 
Congress has control over the purse strings of government, it 
can inquire into any subject that involves the expenditure of 
public funds.187 Congress could even inquire about a presiden-
tial pardon (a power exclusively vested in the President), as-
suming the pardon required appropriations for an amnesty 
program.188 The broad legislative authority (and attendant in-
quiry power) is further expanded because the Court has never 
required that a congressional inquiry actually produce legisla-
tion.189 To the contrary, “investigations may take researchers 
 
 184. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–25 (1997); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
 185. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959); McGrain v. 
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927). 
 186. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
 187. Landis, supra note 68, at 194. 
 188. FISHER, supra note 120, at 183. 
 189. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177 (noting only that the investigation must be 
related to an area on which Congress could legislate and “would be materially 
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up ‘blind alleys’ and into nonproductive enterprises: ‘[t]o be a 
valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end re-
sult.’”190 
As a consequence, a question and report period relating 
only to the areas where Congress could legislate can easily sat-
isfy this first limitation. A question and report period is inti-
mately related to Congress’s inquiry function—a function the 
Court has repeatedly recognized as valid and expansive.191 As 
for objections to a specific question on the basis that Congress 
lacked authority to legislate in that area (thereby justifying a 
refusal to answer), Congress can adopt a series of rules mark-
ing the boundaries of what subjects are proper during the ques-
tion and report period. On this point, parliamentary practice is 
instructive. Parliamentary systems have adopted rules limiting 
the scope of questions—even without separation of powers con-
siderations.192 To that end, Congress can declare some topics 
(i.e., the President’s personal life, the appointment of officers, 
military secrets) as outside the purview of the question and re-
port period. Given the breadth of the legislative power, and 
with some careful self-policing, Congress can create a question 
and report period that is simultaneously useful as an informa-
tion-gathering device and constitutionally compliant. 
A properly crafted question and report period can also sat-
isfy the second factor in the Supreme Court’s separation of 
powers calculus: compulsion or arrogation of power. In Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court up-
held the legislative creation of a non-Article III judicial tribunal 
for certain claimants in a series of cases involving securities 
fraud.193 The Court stressed that “separation of powers con-
cerns [were] diminished” because aggrieved individuals were 
not compelled to appear before the tribunal.194 “[G]iven the de-
gree of judicial control saved to the federal courts,” the Court 
rejected a separation of powers challenge.195 Similarly, in Mor-
rison, the Court cited absence of compulsion as one of the rea-
 
aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit”); see 
also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (same). 
 190. FISHER, supra note 120, at 168 (quoting Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975)). 
 191. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
 192. See ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW, supra note 19, at 287–94. 
 193. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 842 
(1986). 
 194. Id. at 855. 
 195. Id. 
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sons why provisions of the Ethics in Government Act creating 
an independent prosecutor passed constitutional muster.196 
Assuming a question and report period would preserve an 
executive official’s right to decline to answer a question, it 
would not permit the legislative branch to control another 
branch, and thus is acceptable, like the legislation affirmed in 
Schor and Morrison.197 As in Schor and Morrison, Congress can 
avoid allegations that it is impermissibly controlling the execu-
tive branch by permitting executive branch officials to refuse to 
comply with congressional requests—namely, to refuse to an-
swer oral or written questions. Furthermore, by adopting flexi-
ble rules for when executive officials appear, Congress could 
minimize most, if not all, of any compulsion associated with the 
question and report period. The only consequences for failure to 
appear or for providing evasive answers would arise through 
the normal political and budgeting processes. Finally, a ques-
tion and report period is arguably less offensive to executive 
control of information than extant statutory authority. Unlike 
the Freedom of Information Act, for example, a question and 
report period would impose no mandatory duty to disclose in-
formation. Because the question and report period need not ex-
hibit any attempt to aggrandize legislative power by controlling 
executive officials, it would not violate the separation of powers 
principles set forth in Schor and Morrison.198 
Lastly, a question and report period need not violate the 
third main limitation on legislative conduct as it relates to 
separation of powers: impairment of the executive branch’s con-
stitutional functions.199 This functionalist balancing test 
weighs the extent of impairment against the overriding need to 
promote objectives assigned to the legislature by the Constitu-
 
 196. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–95 (1988). 
 197. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court stated that the President is not ac-
countable to the legislature except when she is impeached. 478 U.S. 714, 722 
(1986). But this finding cannot reasonably be understood to abrogate Con-
gress’s oversight function. Moreover, even in Bowsher, the Court took pains to 
recognize the critical importance of the President’s accountability to the peo-
ple. Id. 
 198. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (noting that Congress had not violated 
separation of powers because it could not compel the Attorney General to com-
ply with its request); Schor, 478 U.S. at 727 (finding that the congressional 
action in question did not pose a “dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Ex-
ecutive Branch functions” by requiring compliance). 
 199. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711–12 (1974). 
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tion.200 As discussed above, the Court has long recognized the 
importance of Congress’s oversight function.201 Balanced 
against this vital role, the executive branch has only a negligi-
ble dignity interest in refusing even to entertain congressional 
questions.202 Stated differently, listening to questions, without 
an obligation to answer, does not undermine constitutional 
functions. And unlike the situations in Bowsher v. Synar or 
INS v. Chadha, a question and report period would in no way 
prevent the executive branch from exercising its constitution-
ally assigned function to execute the laws. The President still 
would retain control over appointing and dismissing officials, 
and would direct the extent to which the officials complied with 
legislative information requests. Therefore, the question and 
answer process would not interfere with the President’s ability 
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”203 The core 
executive functions would remain safely under executive con-
trol, and therefore a question and report period need not “in-
trude upon the central prerogatives of” the executive branch in 
any significant way.204 
Far from impairing executive functions, a question and re-
port period might increase public awareness of and support for 
executive policies in two principal ways. First, the period would 
provide the President with another venue to convince the 
American people (and their elected representatives) of the im-
portance and superiority of her policies. Second, while the 
President would not have the authority to ask questions of leg-
islators, she could expect “friendly” questions from members of 
her own party. These friendly questions would ensure that the 
President is not faced with an entirely hostile environment. In 
these ways, a question and report period might actually in-
crease executive influence at the expense of the legislature. 
 
 200. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 443; United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. at 711–12. 
 201. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694 (describing Congress’s investiga-
tory/oversight function as “incidental to the legislative function”); Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957) (“[A]n investigation is part of lawmak-
ing. It is justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process.”). 
 202. Congress has long recognized (and accommodated) this interest. See, 
e.g., S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 7 (1881) (“The committee ventures again to repeat 
that the effect of the bill does not seek to—and will not—aggrandize or impair 
the executive power as defined in the Constitution and vested in the Presi-
dent.”). 
 203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 204. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996). 
HONTOS_4FMT 4/16/2007 8:51:15 AM 
1078 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1047 
 
To be sure, a question and report period might physically 
tie up an official for a few hours per month—arguably impair-
ing the official’s other constitutional duties during that limited 
time. But a congressional request that an executive official 
spend a morning on Capitol Hill is far different from an at-
tempt to create a quasi-executive administrator of the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (as in Bowsher205) or 
to veto executive branch conduct (as in Chadha206). Even as-
suming the question period burdens a cabinet official, the im-
portance of the question and report period should take prece-
dence.207 Congress could even mitigate these concerns by 
appropriating additional funding, thereby ensuring that cabi-
net officials have sufficient staff to respond to and prepare for 
the legislative inquiries.208 Congress could further ameliorate 
concerns about impairment of constitutional duties by creating 
a series of flexible rules for physical appearances. These rules 
might include limitations on the number or length of an offi-
cial’s appearances. They might also create a series of exceptions 
allowing the official, for example, to skip the question period in 
cases of emergency or unavoidable conflict. These steps would 
preempt executive branch arguments of infringement. 
These minor infringements on executive functions are bal-
anced, in accordance with the Court’s calculus in Nixon v. Ad-
ministrator of General Services, against numerous important 
legislative interests and objectives.209 This Note has discussed 
these interests in detail above, but they are all intimately re-
lated to Congress’s inquiry power. They include making in-
 
 205. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S 714, 734 (1986) (“By placing the responsi-
bility for execution of the . . . Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to 
removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execu-
tion of the Act and has intruded into the executive function. The Constitution 
does not permit such intrusion.”). 
 206. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (“Disagreement with the 
Attorney General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation—that is, Congress’ deci-
sion to deport Chadha—no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to 
the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves determina-
tions of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral pas-
sage followed by presentment to the President.”). 
 207. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 46-837, at 8 (1881) (describing cabinet official 
testimony as outweighing “the harassing cares of distributing clerkships and 
closely supervising the mere machinery of the departments”). 
 208. Id. (describing a willingness to increase agency budgets to free up 
cabinet officials). 
 209. 433 U.S. 425, 452–54 (1977). 
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formed public policy decisions and crafting cogent legislation,210 
exercising effective oversight of executive programs,211 and dis-
seminating information to the public.212 The Court has also rec-
ognized that Congress, in addition to acquiring information to 
create public policy and crafting remedial legislation, has an in-
terest to help “restore public confidence in our political process[
].”213 A public debate about the most important issues of the 
day would directly effectuate all of these interests. Congress’s 
inquiry power is much more central to these core responsibili-
ties than is the President’s interest in avoiding the indignity of 
answering questions for a short period of time each month. Be-
cause a question and report period need not violate the funda-
mental separation of powers principles underlying the constitu-
tional scheme, it could serve as “proper” exercise of legislative 
authority. 
b. Executive Privilege 
While related to separation of powers, executive privilege 
presents an independent challenge to the constitutionality of a 
question and report period. It does so in two primary ways. 
First, the executive branch could argue that the entire question 
and report regime is not constitutionally proper because it con-
flicts with a generalized executive privilege. Second, executive 
privilege may be invoked so often that it renders the question 
and report period ineffective. In light of Supreme Court prece-
dent, a well crafted question and report period could overcome 
both of these objections. 
One foreseeable executive branch response to a question 
and report period is to refuse to comply in any form under a 
generalized assertion of privilege. In essence, the President 
could argue that the mere existence of the question and report 
period violates executive branch privileges. In United States v. 
Nixon, the Court confronted a similar issue, namely, whether a 
“generalized” executive interest in privilege would trump a spe-
cific judicial interest in the “fair administration of criminal jus-
 
 210. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (“[Congress] cannot 
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the con-
ditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”). 
 211. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 167, at 2343 (“[A] crucial part of 
Congress’s job is keeping the Executive accountable.”). 
 212. Cf. WILSON, supra note 158, at 303 (“The informing function of Con-
gress should be preferred even to its legislative function.”). 
 213. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 453. 
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tice.”214 In answering that question in the negative, the Court 
noted that while the President’s need for confidentiality is “gen-
eral in nature,” the need for the production of evidence is “spe-
cific and central to the fair . . . administration of justice.”215 
Just as the acquisition of evidence is critical to the judicial 
function, the acquisition of information is central to the legisla-
tive function.216 A question and report period is a proper exer-
cise of legislative power because it serves as a critical means—
much like the judicial subpoena—to acquire information. 
To be sure, there are differences between a narrowly tai-
lored subpoena (as in United States v. Nixon217) and a broad 
question and report period. But a question and report period 
would not violate executive privilege any more than the mere 
issuance of a judicial subpoena in United States v. Nixon. If 
anything, a question and report period is less onerous than the 
judicial (or congressional) subpoena because it is not compul-
sory. The question and report period’s constitutional saving 
grace is its lack of compulsion. It bears repeating that the ex-
ecutive branch could refuse to answer questions based on ex-
ecutive privilege or otherwise. In short, a generally asserted 
executive privilege does not convert a question and answer pe-
riod into an improper exercise of legislative power. 
The second likely argument is that the question and report 
period would infringe the President’s right to assert executive 
privilege even on narrower grounds. The Court in United States 
v. Nixon cautiously stated that, although Nixon’s generalized 
interest was insufficient to defeat a subpoena, the privilege did 
protect certain communications.218 However, Congress could 
avoid the assertion that the question and report period is alto-
gether improper through careful formulation and administra-
tion of the period. For example, to steer clear of executive privi-
lege issues, Congress could simply follow the path of least 
 
 214. 418 U.S. 683, 711–12 (1974). 
 215. Id. at 712–13. 
 216. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Eastland v. U.S. Ser-
vicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 
178, 197 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). 
 217. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706–07 (noting that the subpoena 
did not violate a “need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national se-
curity secrets” and would be conducted in camera “with all the protection that 
a district court will be oblidged to provide” to protect confidentiality). 
 218. Id. at 705 (“[There is a] valid need for protection of communications 
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in 
the performance of their manifold duties.”). 
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resistance: acknowledge the viability of a limited executive 
privilege. If Congress recognized in the statute authorizing a 
question and report period the right of executive officials to re-
fuse to answer questions on narrow privilege grounds, it could 
outflank executive branch assertions that the question and re-
port period violates executive privilege. By recognizing the ex-
ecutive branch official’s limited right to refuse to answer, a 
question and report period and executive privilege could coexist 
in constitutional harmony. 
Not only would Congressional acquiescence with executive 
privilege disarm the executive branch of one possible challenge, 
it also would not substantially undermine the efficacy and pur-
pose of a question and report period. To ensure some respon-
siveness from executive officials, Congress could look to other, 
non-coercive enforcement mechanisms. As parliamentary prac-
tice—even without the doctrine of executive privilege—
demonstrates, substantively deficient answers do not go unpun-
ished. Refusing to answer a question or providing indirect an-
swers “can, in [its] own way, shed just as much light on gov-
ernment policy (or the lack of it) in a particular area as a full 
and detailed response, which in practice may conceal more than 
it reveals.”219 In the United States, the public would likely view 
a refusal to answer or invocation of executive privilege as an 
admission of liability.220 In addition to facing public suspicion, a 
recalcitrant executive official could be punished for her failure 
to answer questions through other legislative mechanisms. For 
instance, Congress’s power of the purse is particularly well 
suited to ensure executive branch compliance—without abridg-
ing executive privilege.221 Congress could refuse to act on the 
 
 219. ADAM TOMKINS, THE CONSTITUTION AFTER SCOTT: GOVERNMENT UN-
WRAPPED 99 (1998); see also Giddings, supra note 154, at 136 (“[G]enerally 
speaking, ministers prefer to answer if they can—not least because it looks 
better from a public relations viewpoint, and . . . a refusal may offend.”). 
 220. Marshall, supra note 82, at 811 (“Because the press (and to a lesser 
extent, the Congress) equates a claim of executive privilege with that of a 
cover-up, the result is that the claim of executive privilege has become a politi-
cal liability to the President who invokes it. In fact, its invocation is often so 
damaging to a President that forcing the President to claim it can mark the 
victory of his opponents by itself.”). 
 221. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (describing Congress’s power of 
the purse as particularly well suited to monitor the “wisdom and soundness of 
Executive action”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison), supra note 43, 
at 394 (“This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most com-
plete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immedi-
ate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, 
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President’s legislative agenda as it relates to the question prof-
fered. And for truly serious matters, a question and report pe-
riod would not abrogate Congress’s subpoena and impeachment 
functions. Evasive answers or excessive invocations of execu-
tive privilege would rightly place the executive official between 
the Scylla of public scorn and suspicion and the Charybdis of 
damaged congressional relations. 
B. THE STATE OF THE UNION CLAUSE AS A SOURCE FOR A 
QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD 
In addition to the Necessary and Proper Clause, the State 
of the Union Clause presents a supplemental constitutional 
foundation for a question and report period. Despite its infre-
quent judicial treatment as a constitutional source of power, 
the clause supports a more robust executive branch disclosure 
requirement. Given Congress’s substantial interest in access to 
executive branch information and agency oversight, a statutory 
question and report period would closely conform to the broader 
purposes of the State of the Union Clause. 
In his treatise on the Constitution, Justice Story described 
the clause as a manifestation of the importance of executive-
legislative information sharing.222 “There is great wisdom,” 
Story emphasized, “in not merely allowing, but in requiring, the 
president to lay before congress all facts and information, 
which may assist in their deliberations; and in enabling him at 
once to point out the evil and to suggest the remedy.”223 The 
State of the Union Clause demonstrates the President’s respon-
sibility “not merely for a due administration of the existing sys-
tems, but for due diligence and examination into the means of 
improving them.”224 Story’s commentary supports a question 
and report period in at least two ways: (1) the President’s obli-
gation to engage Congress in a direct and bilateral manner, and 
(2) the importance of the President’s ongoing role in that re-
gard. To these ends, the actions of the first Congress are again 
illustrative. In coupling an ongoing obligation of the Treasury 
 
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.”); Kate Stith, 
Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988) 
(“[A]ppropriations do not merely set aside particular amounts of money; they 
define the character, extent, and scope of authorized activities.”). 
 222. 2 STORY, supra note 29, § 1561, at 417 (describing the importance and 
validity of the State of the Union Clause as “above all real objection”). 
 223. Id. § 1561, at 418 (emphasis added). 
 224. Id. 
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Secretary to disclose information to Congress with the Act cre-
ating the Treasury Department,225 the first Congress “followed 
the furrow plowed by the . . . State of the Union clause.”226 Not-
withstanding its infrequent judicial treatment, the State of the 
Union Clause envisioned an extensive and continuing role for 
the executive branch in the legislative process. 
The reality of early congressional practice further supports 
a pragmatic and broader view of the State of the Union Clause. 
The Constitution’s text mandates only one congressional ses-
sion per year and does not describe its length.227 While the im-
portance of an open and accessible executive branch has been 
important from the Founding, the reality was that the early 
legislative branch convened infrequently because of geographic 
considerations.228 Although the prospect of an absentee Con-
gress is unlikely in the modern era, in the early days of the Re-
public “Americans expected that [federal] legislators would 
typically meet in short sessions and quickly return back home 
to live (like everyone else) under the laws just made.”229 The 
President, on the other hand, was always on duty.230 Because of 
this early practice, Congress needed immediate, extensive, and 
continuing contact with the executive branch in order to remain 
apprised of issues of national importance. 
Moreover, the clause goes further than the British custom 
(with the King’s yearly speech to Parliament) by mandating ex-
ecutive branch disclosures “from time to time.”231 Noting the 
impossibility of identifying every time when the duty would be 
 
 225. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, 1 Stat. 65, 65–66 
(1789). 
 226. BERGER, supra note 68, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least 
once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in Decem-
ber, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.”), amended by U.S. 
CONST. amend. XX, § 2 (changing the meeting date to “the 3d day of Janu-
ary”). 
 228. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succes-
sion Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 125–28 (1995); Ruth C. Silva, 
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 452 n.4 (1949) 
(describing nine-month lapses in congressional sessions). 
 229. Amar & Amar, supra note 228, at 126. 
 230. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and 
Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995) 
(“Unlike federal lawmakers and judges, the President is at ‘Session’ twenty-
four hours a day, every day. Constitutionally speaking, the President never 
sleeps.”); Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 29–32. 
 231. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
HONTOS_4FMT 4/16/2007 8:51:15 AM 
1084 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1047 
 
required, Kesavan and Sidak have persuasively posited that 
the phrase “from time to time,” should be understood as some-
thing “more than ‘at least once during every session of Con-
gress.’”232 It is difficult to imagine, given the early irregularity 
of legislative sessions and the exigencies of national govern-
ment, that a single annual message “exhaust[s] the duty to 
furnish information ‘from time to time.’”233 Moreover, if the 
Framers truly envisaged a yearly speech, they could have eas-
ily drafted language more clearly reflecting this less onerous 
presidential duty. 
Some commentators have argued that the State of the Un-
ion Clause did not authorize Congress to compel executive 
branch dialogue and information sharing.234 However, the fact 
that the State of the Union Clause imposes an affirmative duty 
on the President—and does not explicitly confer power on Con-
gress—is not fatal to a broader understanding of the clause. As 
an initial matter, the Supreme Court has long recognized that 
one who is owed a duty has a correlative right to require per-
formance of the duty.235 As Professor Berger posited, “what the 
President is under a duty to furnish to Congress ‘from time to 
time’ could be requested at its convenience.”236 At least one 
nineteenth-century lawmaker also mentioned this view of the 
State of the Union Clause.237 
Kesavan and Sidak disagreed with this understanding of 
the clause, arguing that the clause did “not signify any kind of 
congressional prerogative. [It did] not provide that ‘Congress 
 
 232. Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 16. (“The phrase is to be inter-
preted flexibly because it was impossible for the Framers to specify all of the 
times that would give rise to the duty of the clauses.”). 
 233. BERGER, supra note 68, at 38. 
 234. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 91, at 1207 n.262 (“The State 
of the Union Clause . . . imposes an obligation on the President only ‘from time 
to time’ and only on general matters such as the circumstances of the whole 
country. This Clause gives Congress no power to require presidential opinions 
in writing upon any subject relating to the President’s duties, because the 
Clause governs information exchanges between two independent and co-equal 
departments of the national government.”); Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, 
at 7–8 (arguing that Berger’s reading is “textually awkward and wrong”). 
 235. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 236. BERGER, supra note 68, at 37 (emphasis in original). 
 237. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (1842) (statement of Rep. 
Cushing) (“The clause requiring the President to see to the execution of the 
laws, and to give information to Congress of the state of the Union, was im-
perative on the President, and constituted an obligation, by the omission of 
which he violated the Constitution and his oath of office, and was liable to im-
peachment.”). 
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may from time to time require the President to give to the Con-
gress Information of the State of the Union.’”238 Yet, even as-
suming the validity of this reading, the State of the Union 
Clause can still justify a question and report period. Assuming 
it does not require the President to give Congress information 
through a coercive mechanism, a question and report period 
safely falls within the clause’s scope because it fulfills its other 
underlying purposes (i.e., access to information, dialogue, and 
government transparency). The lack of compulsion demon-
strates that a question and report period can coexist with even 
Kesavan and Sidak’s narrow textual analysis of the State of the 
Union Clause. 
Similarly, Calabresi and Rhodes’s dismissal of the State of 
the Union Clause does not fatally weaken the clause’s role as a 
supporting source for a question and report period. In their zeal 
to nullify any congressional interference with executive branch 
functions, Calabresi and Rhodes failed to justify their limited 
understanding of the clause. For example, they argued that the 
clause requires the President to discuss “general matters” 
only.239 This reading is not textually self evident,240 and it was 
repudiated in the early years of the Republic.241 Second, a ques-
tion and report period would not give Congress the power to 
“require presidential opinions in writing upon any subject.”242 
Congress could only ask the executive branch for information in 
those areas in which Congress could legislate—and even then, 
the executive branch’s compliance would be voluntary. Finally, 
even assuming the validity of a more limited view of the State 
of the Union Clause, a question and report period lacking a 
compulsive mechanism (e.g., the contempt sanction) would not 
require anything from the executive branch. Although a 
healthy (if undeveloped) debate exists about the State of the 
Union Clause’s meaning, the clause not only encourages 
 
 238. Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 88, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 239. Id. 
 240. It is not necessarily true that, because informing Congress about the 
“state of the union” is a broad topic, the President is limited to a superficial or 
generalized message. An equally plausible reading is that the clause envisions 
the President providing specific details about a wide variety of important is-
sues and enactments of the day. 
 241. 2 STORY, supra note 29, § 1561, at 417–18 (describing the President’s 
unique knowledge of a variety of subjects, including the “true workings of the 
laws . . . of trade, finance, and . . . justice; . . . and the military, naval, and civil 
establishments of the union”). 
 242. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 91, at 1207 n.262. 
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greater executive-legislative dialogue, but also imposes recipro-
cal duties on the President to disclose, and the Congress to in-
quire.243 A question and report period would facilitate both of 
these obligations. 
IV.  THE CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF A LIMITED 
QUESTION AND REPORT PERIOD   
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that crafting a con-
stitutional question and report period is no small task. There 
are many procedural and substantive details of a question and 
report period that warrant further study. The purpose of this 
Note, however, is not to devise each provision of a question and 
report period, but instead to demonstrate the constitutional va-
lidity of the general endeavor. Notwithstanding this modest 
purpose, it is possible to sketch broadly the basic provisions of a 
question and report period in the United States. 
Generally, a question and report period would share many 
of the British and Canadian provisions. This premise relies on 
a recognition of the relative success of Question Time in those 
countries qua accountability guarantor and information-
gathering mechanism. It also acknowledges the common law 
traditions those countries share with the United States. Consti-
tutionally, there is little difference for purposes of a question 
and report period between confirmable cabinet officials and the 
President. Therefore, a question and report period could involve 
cabinet officials as well as the President. It could take place in 
a joint session of Congress, or separately in either house. 
As with the British custom, a question and report period in 
the United States could take either (or both) of two forms: writ-
ten and oral questions. In the written component, legislators 
could ask an unlimited number of written questions, addressed 
to the executive official who is responsible to the subject matter 
of the question. The President or cabinet official would respond, 
if at all, by way of publication of both the question and the an-
swer in the Federal Register (or some other publication). Re-
sembling the practice in parliamentary systems (but for differ-
ent reasons, namely separation of powers and executive 
privilege), a member of Congress would have no formal en-
forcement mechanism for an executive official’s failure to re-
spond to a written question. 
 
 243. BERGER, supra note 68, at 38. 
HONTOS_4FMT 4/16/2007 8:51:15 AM 
2007] EXECUTIVE QUESTION & REPORT PERIODS 1087 
 
In the oral component of the question and answer regime, 
individual members of Congress could ask the President and 
cabinet level officials direct questions for a specified amount of 
time each month (e.g., one to two hours). To facilitate this ex-
change, Congress would promulgate a series of rules apportion-
ing time equally between the minority and majority parties, de-
scribing the form and mode of questions, and determining 
which members of each party are allowed to ask questions. An-
swers (and questions) would be published in the Congressional 
Record. As with written questions, the separation of powers 
and executive privilege doctrines would limit the scope of the 
oral questions to preserve executive branch prerogatives. For 
example, a question must be related to a subject on which Con-
gress could legislate. Further, the executive official would not 
be under oath and would retain, on privilege grounds or other-
wise, the right to not answer a question altogether. There could 
be no judicial sanction for failure to respond. As discussed 
above, excessive refusals to answer or failure to appear would 
expose the executive official to political and policy conse-
quences. 
  CONCLUSION   
Transparency, accountability, and the primacy of Congress 
are essential components of the U.S. constitutional structure. 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 these traits have atro-
phied. A question and report period is a modest—and constitu-
tional—step toward restoring those foundational attributes of 
American democracy. 
A legislatively mandated executive branch question and 
report period is neither new nor revolutionary. It is also not a 
panacea to remedy the expansion of executive power and the 
growth of the administrative bureaucracy; crafting a question 
and report period that concurrently complies with separation of 
powers while also remaining an effective tool will be difficult. 
And there may be logistical problems during its implementa-
tion. Despite these challenges, this Note demonstrates not only 
that a question and report period is compatible with the U.S. 
political system, but also that such an effort is worth renewed 
attention in Congress and in legal scholarship. To improve gov-
ernment in the post-9/11 world, Congress should look to a de-
cidedly pre-9/11 mechanism: the question and report period. 
